Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Flying Diamond Corporation v. Anthon Rust and
Ona Rust : Amicus Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gayle F. McKeachnie; McKeachnie and Seager; Attorneys for Appellant; Keith E. Taylor; James B.
Lee; J. Brent Garfield; Pasons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Amicus Curiae.
Gordon A. Madsen, Robert C. Cummings; Madsen, Cummings and Harris; Attorneys for
Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Flying Diamond v. Rust, No. 14338.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1429

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

1~JUJM1977

FLYING DIAMOND CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

<tid.*«*.,,

i . , ,...

(j,.A

.vs.
C a s e No. 14338

ANTHON RUST,
Defendant-Respondent,
UTAH MINING ASSOCIATION,
Amicus Curiae.
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

Appeal From the Decision of the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District, The
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge.

:, •*-' •. .

...iw;:lY

J. uCiiJwU L™*: L::; Suool

GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE of
MCKEACHNIE & SEAGER
64 East Main Street, #12
Vernal, Utah 84078
Attorneys for Appellant
GORDON A. MADSEN and
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS of
MADSEN, CUMMINGS & HARRIS
320 South Third East
P. 0. Box 1783
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondent

KEITH E. TAYLOR
JAMES B. LEE and
J. BRENT GARFIELD of
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Utah Mining Association
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT .

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I - THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
APPLIED THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED RULE
THAT THE MINERAL ESTATE IS DOMINENT OVER
THE SURFACE ESTATE AND CARRIES WITH IT
THE RIGHT TO USE AS MUCH OF THE SURFACE
AS IS REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR THE ENJOYMENT OF THE MINERAL INTEREST

4

POINT II - THE OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT
IS AMBIGUOUS AS TO WHAT RULE OF LAW WAS
APPLIED BUT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE
APPLIED THE RULE SET FORTH IN POINT I
ABOVE OR TO HAVE PROPERLY OR CONSISTENTLY
APPLIED ANY RECOGNIZED RULE
.

11

CONCLUSION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

AUTHORITIES
Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1968)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1 (Supp. 1975)

Page
6
15

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A(d) .. 13
Cases;
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 403
S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1966)

7

Atkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d
633 (W.V. 1950)

9

Charles F. Haynes & Associates, Inc. v.
Blue, 233 S.2d 127 (Miss. 1970)

8

Davon Drilling Co. v. Ginder, 467 P.2d
470 (Okla. 1970)

10

East v. Pan Am Petroleum Corp., 168
S.2d 426 (La. App. Ct. 1964)

10

Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829
(N.D. 1969)

10

Fowler v. Delaplain, 87 N.E. 260 (Ohio
1909)

10

Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d
618 (Tex. 1971)

17

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Deese, 153 S.2d
614 (Ala. 1963)

6

Hurley v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.,
455 P.2d 321 (Mont. 1969)

10

Illinois Basin Oil Association v. Lynn,
425 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. App. Ct. 1968)

10

MacDonnell v. Capital Co., 130 F.2d 311
(9th Cir. 1942)

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

McLeod v. Cities Service Gas Co., 131
F. Supp. 449 (D. Ct. District of Kansas
1955)
Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808
(Tex. 1972)

10
9

Other Authorities:
4 Summers, OIL & GAS, § 652 at 2-5 (1962) ..

4

1 Williams & Myers, OIL & GAS LAW, § 301
at 431-432 (1975)

4

Ferguson, SEVERED SURFACE AND MINERAL
ESTATE - RIGHT TO USE, DAMAGE OR DESTROY
THE SURFACE TO RECOVER MINERALS, 19
Rocky Mt. Mineral Law Inst., at 412414 (1974)
Gray, A NEW APPRAISAL OF THE RIGHTS OF
LESSEE UNDER OIL AND GAS LEASES TO USE
AND OCCUPY THE SURFACE, 20 Rocky Mt.
Mineral Law Inst., 227 at 241 (1975)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

16

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FLYING DIAMOND CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ANTHON RUST,

CASE NO. 14338

Defendant and Respondent.
UTAH MINING ASSOCIATION,
Amicus Curiae,,

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit by an Oil and Gas Lessee against the owner
of the surface estate seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting
the owner of the surface estate from interfering with the establishment
and operation of drilling operations on the property and, also,
seeking damages resulting from interference already caused by
the surface owner; the surface owner counterclaimed seeking
compensation for the Lessee's use of the surface claiming it to
be not reasonably necessary, a taking of property and destructive
of the surface owner8s use of the property.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial of the matter the trial court dismissed the
complaint and held that the surface owner was entitled to damages
for the property "taken" by the lessee for the location of its
well site and access road, for damage to crops growing on the
property, and for damage caused to the surface by the unreasonable
location of the lessee's access road.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It is the position of the Utah Mining Association that the
trial court did not apply the correct rule of law to the facts
presented on the record and that the Utah Supreme Court should
adopt the rule set forth herein and remand the case to the trial
court for reconsideration in light of the proper rule, or in the
alternative that the Court apply the rule set forth herein and
enter a judgment in accordance therewith,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Utah Mining Association is a non-profit trade association
whose membership is composed of companies and individuals that
produce most of the metals, coal and industrial and agricultural
minerals mined in the state and includes manufacturer's and
suppliers in Utah who provide goods and services to the mineral
industry.

Because of the obvious interest that the Association

has in maintaining a favorable atmosphere for the mineral interests
and industries in the State of Utah and because of the Association's
interest in establishing legal precedents in the mining and
mineral law of the State of Utah which are clear, unambiguous
and in conformity with principles of mining and mineral law
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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generally accepted in the United States, the Association has
sought permission to file this Amicus Brief.

It is the belief

of the Utah Mining Association that the Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law and the Memorandum Decision of the trial
court are both ambiguous and out of step with generally recognized
principles of. mining and mineral law.
In its Findings of Facts the trial court found that the
defendant-respondent had acquired surface rights in the subject
parcel of land by a deed which specifically reserved to the
grantors "all gas, oil and other mineral rights."

[Exhibit 2].

The trial court further found that the plaintiff-appellant was
the successor in interest to the mineral rights reserved by
defendant-respondent's grantors pursuant to the terms of an oil
and gas lease.

[Exhibit 3].

As the holder of the mineral

rights the plaintiff-appellant sought to commence drilling
operations on the 40 acre tract of which defendant-respondent
was the surface owner.

On January 13, 1974, the plaintiff-

appellant entered the property and commenced the preparation of
the drill site. Defendant-respondent and the Sheriff of Duchesne
County refused to allow the preparation to continue and ordered
plaintiff-appellant from the property. [T.14, 16]. On February
6, 1974, a preliminary injunction restraining defendant-respondent
from further interference with plaintiff-appellant's establishment
of an oil and gas well drill site and access road on the property
issued.

[R. 46,17].

Pursuant to the injunction plaintiff-

appellant put in the access road and drill site as shown on the
plat map.

[Exhibit 4].
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED
THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED RULE THAT THE
MINERAL ESTATE IS DOMINANT OVER THE
SURFACE ESTATE AND CARRIES WITH IT THE
RIGHT TO USE AS MUCH OF THE SURFACE AS
IS REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR THE ENJOYMENT OF THE MINERAL INTEREST
The generally recognized and accepted rule setting forth
the respective rights of the owners of the mineral estate and
the surface estate has been stated as follows:
"An oil and gas lease carries with it the right
to possession of the surface to the extent reasonably
necessary to enable the lessee to perform the obligations
imposed upon him by the lease. ?This rule is based
upon the principle that when a thing is granted all
the means to obtain it and all the fruits and effects
of it are also granted.' Accordingly, the right to
such use of the surface is implied if it is not
granted, whether the form of conveyance is a mineral
deed or a lease." 4 Summers, OIL AND GAS, § 652 at 25 (1962).
The rule has been similarly recognized and explained in the
following:
"The permissible interests that may be created in
oil and gas are best identified and understood by
beginning with fee simple absolute ownership of land.
A/ the owner in fee absolute of Blackacre, has the
same rights, privileges, powers and immunities with
regard to the minerals therein as he has in the surface,
subject of course to regulation under the police power
of
the state. This totality of interest may be granted
:
or reserved separate and apart from the surface, and
such severance of minerals from surface interest
creates what is called here a mineral estate, being
the most complete ownership of oil and gas recognized
in law. The owner of the mineral estate (B) has the
same rights, privileges, powers, and immunities as A
had before him: with respect to the minerals, B
stands in in the shoes of A. 1 Williams and Meyers,
OIL AND GAS LAW, § 301 at 431-32 (1975).
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In this case, the owner of the property (mineral and surface)
conveyed the surface to defendant-respondent and retained the
mineral estate to himself.

In retaining to himself the mineral

estate the defendant-respondent's grantor certainly could not
have intended to place the mineral estate beyond his own reach.
The retention of the mineral estate implies a retention of the
right to use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary
to the development and enjoyment of the estate retained. As the
successor in interest to the rights retained by defendantrespondent's grantor, the plaintiff-appellant stands in the
shoes of the grantor and may properly exercise every right
retained by the grantor.

The plaintiff-respondent, therefore,

possesses the right to enter upon and use so much of the surface
as is reasonably necessary to the development and enjoyment of
the mineral estate.

The surface owner suffers no injury in this

as he bargained for, paid for and obtained the surface rights
subject to the retained mineral estate.

This is evidenced in

his deed and in interfering with the plaintiff-respondent's
development and enjoyment of the mineral estate the defendantrespondent is exercising right and authority over the mineral
estate which he does not and never has possessed.
The above cited authorities and argument do not rest upon
scholarly jurisprudence alone but rather have developed from a
long line of cases beginning in the common law of England and
carrying forward to the present.

This Court has not had occasion

to rule on this matter previously, but it is worthwhile to note

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that under the common law of England the mineral estate was
recognized as the dominant estate and the owner of the mineral
estate had the right to use the surface to extract the minerals.
Ferguson, SEVERED SURFACE AND MINERAL ESTATE - RIGHT TO USE,
DAMAGE OR DESTROY THE SURFACE TO RECOVER MINERALS, 19 Rocky Mt.
Mineral Law Inst., 411 at 412-414 (1974).

The Utah Legislature has

adopted the common law insofar as it has been generally recognized
and enforced in this country and is suitable to conditions
within the state.
"The common law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or the Constitution or
laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adopted to the natural and physical
conditions of this state and the necessities of the
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the
rule of decision in all courts of this state."
Utah Code Ann., §68-3-1 (1968).
Of course, it is not urged that the dominant estate theory
known to English common law is in effect in this state as it
then existed? however, it is a starting place for the development
of the rule as it should be applied in Utah.

Most states have

modified the common law rule by placing the limitation upon the
dominant mineral estate that its dominance extend only to such
use of the surface as is "reasonably necessary" for the mineral
development.

A review of relevant law on this subject reveals

that most states have adopted a theory that the mineral estate
is dominant with the "reasonable necessity" limitation.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Deese, 153 So. 2d. 614 (Ala. 1963),
the Alabama Court refused to uphold a jury verdict granting the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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surface owner compensation for damage caused by the mineral
owner's operation of an oil and gas well on adjacent property.
The mineral owner had leveled and graded the well site, had cut
trees and removed fences, part of which were on plaintiff's
property.
lots.

The mineral owner owned the oil and gas under several

Under a pool agreement, the well was located on a lot

adjacent to and overlapping upon the plaintiff's surface interest.
The Court questioned why the surface owner should have to suffer harm
when he did not share in the ownership of oil under his land.
"If he does not own any interest in the oil, and
hence receives no benefit from its production, then
why should his surface interest be burdened by action
taken in recovering the oil? The obvious answer is
that he acquired the surface subject to the right of
the owner of the oil thereunder to use the surface in
such manner as is reasonably necessary to recover the
oil." 153 So.2d at 618-19.
The Court concluded that since the owner of the oil had a right
to enter the plaintiff's surface estate there had been no trespass
and no damage.
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 403 SW2d 54 (Ark.1966),
the owner of the mineral interest used the water from the surface
owner's stock pond and left it dry.

The Court held that the use

of the surface by the mineral owner was in excess of that which
was reasonably necessary and sustained an award of damages to
the surface owner.

The Court stated:

"It is true that an oil and gas lease gives with it
the right to possession of the surface to the extent
reasonably necessary to enable a lessee to perform the
obligations imposed upon him by the lease. This
includes the right to enter upon the premises and use

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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so much of it, and in such manner, as may be reasonably
necessary to carry out the terms of the lease and
effectuate its purpose." 403 SW2d at 55.
The Court concluded that the unreasonable use by the lessee in
the case was shown by substantial evidence.
In MacDonnell v. Capital Co., 130 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1942),
the Circuit Court applied California law in holding that an oil
and gas lessee did not commit a trespass by entering upon the
surface estate to commence drilling operations and that the
surface owner had no right to recover damages for the destruction
of the surface so long as the lessee followed the usual or
customary methods of mining.

The Court held:

"We are satisfied that the reservation of the mineral
rights in the deed . . . gave it the right to enter
the premises and to remove the minerals in a manner
consistent with proper oil field practice." 130 F.2d at
320.
In Charles F. Haynes & Assoc, Inc. v. Blue, 233 So.2d 127
(Miss.1970), the Mississippi Court held that the surface owner
was not entitled to recover damages caused to the surface when
the wall of a slush pit broke causing spillage.

The Court noted

that the surface owner might have recovered had negligence been
shown but that there was no evidence of negligence.
"We have also pointed out that the oil company, lessee,
had a right to go upon the land for all reasonable
purposes to explore and drill for oil and gas. . . and
may use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary
to exercise its rights. . . but it cannot intentionally
or negligently damage or use more of the land surface
than is reasonably necessary for its mining operation."
233 So.2d at 128.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Sun Oil Co, v, Whitaker, 483 SW2d 808 (Tex. 1912),

the

owner of the mineral estate was using water from its own wells
drilled upon the property to inject into its oil wells to increase
the pressure,, The surface owner argued that Sun Oil had no
right to use the water and that it greatly decreased the value
of the surface estate.

The Court held:

"The oil and gas lessee's estate is the dominant
estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an
express provision for payment, of free use of such
part and so much of the premises as is reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease,
having due regard for the rights of the owner of the
surface estate. [citations omitted] The rights
implied from the grant are implied by law in .all
conveyances of the mineral estate and, absent an
express limitation thereon, are not to be altered by
evidence that the parties to a particular instrument
of conveyance did not intend the legal consequences of
the grant.
The implied grant of reasonable use extends to
and includes the right to use water from the leased
premises in such amount as may be reasonably necessary
to carry out the lessee's operations under the lease.
483 SW2d at 810-11.
Finally, in Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 SE2d 633
(W.Va. 1950), in a case dealing directly with the right of a mineral
owner to place an access road on the surface, the West Virginia
Court held that even though the establishment of such a road was
damaging to the surface it was "damnum absque injuria" since the
mineral owner had the right to use so much of the surface as was
reasonably necessary.
"The defendant had the right to build a road if the same
was reasonable and necessary for the production and
transportation of gas. . . . [citation omitted] The
owner of the minerals underlying land possesses, as
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incident to this ownership, the right to use the
surface in such manner and with such means as would be
fairly necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral
estate.'" 61 SE2d at 635.
The above cited cases are cited by way of illustration and
are by no means all inclusive. A number of other states have
recognized the general rule urged above.

See, e.g., Illinois Basin

Oil Association v. Lynn, 425 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. App. Ct. 1968);
East v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 168 So.2d 426 (La. App.
Ct. 1964); McLeod v. Cities Service Gas Co., 131 F.Supp. 449
(D.C.D. Kan. 1955); Hurley v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 455 P.2d
321 (Mont. 1969); Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829
(N.D.1969); Flowler v. Delaplain, 87 N.E. 260 (Ohio 1909);
and Davon Drilling Company v. Ginder, 467 P.2d 470 (Okla. 1970).
The above cited cases cut two ways.

In some, the surface

owner has been compensated for an unreasonable use of the surface
by the mineral owner, while in others the surface use has been found
reasonable and no compensation has been allowed.

The important

point in the above cited cases and authorities is that they
apply a uniform principle of law.
It is, therefore, urged that this Court adopt a principle
of law to govern this case and to establish a precedent in Utah
which is in conformity with the authorities cited above.

Such a

principle should provide for the following considerations:

(1)

That the mineral estate is dominant over the surface estate;
because without such dominance the mineral estate would become
valueless to its owner; because the surface owner has notice of
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the mineral interest as contained in the grant or reservation
creating it and his bargain takes into consideration such outstanding interests; and because when a mineral interest is
granted or retained it can only be implied that the grantor or
retainer intended to also grant or retain the means reasonably
necessary to obtain what he has granted or retained; (2) That
the dominance of the mineral estate should not be absolute, else
the surface owner could be unjustly and unnecessarily deprived
of valuable property and valuable resources could be needlessly
wasted; (3) That the proper limitation to place upon the dominant
mineral estate is that the mineral estate may only enter upon,
use, destroy, or damage the surface to an extent reasonably
necessary to discover and recover the minerals; and (4) That the
dominance of the mineral estate can be limited, controlled, or
given up by specific agreement of the parties in the deed or
lease granting or retaining the estate.
The adoption of the above outlined principles by this Court
would promote the orderly development of the mineral industry in
Utah while at the same time protecting the reasonable interest
of the surface owners.

It maintains a balance in the proper use

of all resources and provides an incentive for mineral owners
and surface owners to act reasonably and with necessary constraint.
POINT II
THE OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AMBIGUOUS AS
TO WHAT RULE OF LAW WAS APPLIED BUT DOES NOT
APPEAR TO HAVE APPLIED THE RULE SET FORTH
IN POINT I ABOVE OR TO HAVE PROPERLY OR
CONSISTENTLY APPLIED ANY RECOGNIZED RULE.
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The counterclaim of the defendant-respondent sought damages
based upon four separate theories:

(1) That the plaintiff-

appellant as the mineral owner had no right to enter upon or
commence drilling operations using the surface; (2) That the
plaintiff-appellant's use of the surface constituted a taking by
eminent domain; (3) That the plaintiff-appellant's use of the surface
was not reasonably necessary; and (4) That under the terms of the
oil and gas lease plaintiff-appellant was required to compensate
defendant-respondent for the loss of "growing crops theretofore
planted on said land,"
As to (1) above, the trial court apparently found initially
that the mineral owner did have the right to enter upon the land
and commence drilling operations. A preliminary injunction was
issued by the trial court on February 6, 1974, which enjoined
the surface owner from interfering with the mineral owner's
establishment of drilling operations [R. at 46.]

The basis for

the injunction is not set forth but rather it provides that it
is issued upon the same terms as the restraining order previously
entered [R. at 17.]

The restraining order stated that it appeared

from the facts set forth in the Complaint that the order should
issue.

In its final order, the trial court dismissed the Complaint

in its entirety [R.at 72.]

No mention is made as to the status

of the preliminary injunction issued on February 6, 1974, so it
must be presumed that it lapsed.

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The issue is, therefore, presented whether or not the trial
court found that plaintiff-appellant had the right to enter upon
and use the surface.

Initially, the Court held that plaintiff-

appellant had the right, for the injunction issued, and the Court
allowed plaintiff-appellant to enter and establish a well.
injunction itself was defective.

The

Rule 65A(d) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure requires that:
"Every order granting an injunction and every
restraining order shall be specific in terms;
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not
by reference to the complaint or other document
the act or acts sought to be restrained. . . . "
[emphasis supplied].
Of course, it can be assumed that the injunction issued for the
correct reason - that the mineral owner possesses the dominant
estate and has the right to enter and use the surface as is
necessary to develop the minerals.

If this is the case, then it

is very difficult to reconcile with the rest of the decision,
and the Court should either remand the case to the trial judge
for clarification or clarify the matter in its final decision in
this matter.

On the other hand, it appears that the trial

court's dismissal of the Complaint ended the injunction and
failed to recognize the rights of the dominant estate. This
would clearly be error under the authorities cited above and the
rule recommended to the Court herein. Also, if this is the
result, the trial court failed to state what rule it was adopting
and its reasons for doing so.

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The second contention of the defendant-respondent was that
the plaintiff-appellanfs use of the surface in developing the
minerals was a taking by eminent domain.
to the problem.

This is a novel approach

Once again, it must turn upon whether the owner

of the mineral estate is the owner of a dominant estate.

If the

mineral owner is the dominant owner, then he enters the property
by right so long as he does nothing which is unreasonable, or
unnecessary.

If the mineral owner enters by right, then he

takes nothing from the surface owner, and the surface owner is not
entitled to compensation.
The trial court's opinion is extremely vague as to how it
dealt with defendant-respondentfs "taking" argument.

The trial

courtfs Memorandum Decision repeatedly uses the term "taken" and
granted the defendant-respondent the fair market value of the
land "taken" in damages.

In its motion objecting to the appearance

of the Utah Mining Association as Amicus Curiae, the defendantrespondent takes the position that the trial court did not hold:
-

"That the holder of a mineral interest is required to
compensate the holder of the surface rights in order
to secure access to the mineral interest for purposes
of exploration and extraction. To the contrary, the
trial court held only that, pursuant to the terms of
the mineral lease involved in this case, the owner of
the surface rights was entitled to compensation for
destruction of growing crops as was provided in the
lease."

If the argument of the defendant-respondent is correct, then the
question should be answered as to why the trial judge continually
refers to the property as being "taken" in his Findings and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Decision, and why he awarded as damages the fair market value
of the property "taken," The value of the crops growing thereon
could not be the same as the fair market value of the land itself.
Under the authorities cited in Point I above, it was clearly
error for the trial court to allow compensation for the "taking"
of property when plaintiff-appellant had the right to reasonably
use the surface in locating its well on the property.

Damages

can only be awarded where it is established that the mineral
owner has used surface not reasonably necessary for the drilling
operation.

In this case, the trial court specifically found

that the amount of surface used was reasonably necessary for the
mineral ownerfs operations.

[R. 64]

was taken from the surface owner.

If this is the case, then nothing

He never possessed the right

to exclude the mineral owner, and his use of the surface was
subject to the dominant estate from the day he received his
interest.
Some of the confusion in this case may have resulted from
the fact that Utah is one of four western states that has adopted
a statutory right of condemnation for mining and oil and gas
operations.

Under the provisions of Utah Code Ann., §78-34-1

(Supp. 1975), property may be condemned for, inter alia, roads
and pipelines, for mining and oil and gas operations.

The Utah

statute recognizes that mining is a "public use." The statute,
however, applies where the mining interest does not already
possess the right to the use of the surface.

One need not take

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by eminent domain what one already possesses.

The purpose of

the Utah statute has been explained as follows:
"A frustrating problem that seems to arise most
frequently in western states occurs when the leased
premises are isolated . . . and access thereto cannot
be gained except by crossing the lands of a third
person. Perhaps unfortunately, one generally does not
have a way of necessity over lands of a stranger even
though his lands are completely surrounded by private
lands, where there is no privity of ownership. In a
number of western states, [Colorado, Utah, Montana and
New Mexico] statutes have been enacted authorizing
acquisition of easements by necessity for mining
purposes." Gray, A NEW APPRAISAL OF THE RIGHTS OF
LESSEES UNDER OIL AND GAS LEASES TO USE AND OCCUPY THE
SURFACE, 20 Rocky Mt. Mineral Law Inst., 227 at 241
(1975). [information added]
The Utah statute was enacted precisely to take care of the
problem described above.

It was certainly not enacted to alter

the status of the mineral estate owner or his rights to enter
upon and use the surface appurtenant to his estate.
The third contention raised by the defendant-respondent was
that the plaintiff-appellant's use of the surface was not reasonably
necessary.

The trial court specifically held that the space

used by the plaintiff-appellant was reasonably necessary to the
establishment of the well.

This holding simply does not square

with the award of damages for the space taken.

If the surface use

was reasonably necessary, the mineral owner had a right to its
use, and there simply was no basis for paying the surface owner
for the use of the space.
The trial court did hold that the location of the road was
not reasonably necessary and awarded damages to the defendant-
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respondent for the injury caused to his land by altering his
irrigation system.

If indeed the location of the road was not

reasonably necessary, this award would seem to be justified in
keeping with the rule set forth in POINT I of this Brief.
However, the trial court stated that it was applying the concept
of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 SW2d 618 (Tex. 1971).

In the

Getty case, the surface owner expended a great deal of money in
placing an elevated irrigation system on its land.
would clear obstacles 7 feet high.

The system

Neighbors of Jones had

similar systems, and oil companies had installed two different
types of wells on their property which did not interfere with their
irrigation systems. Getty placed wells on the Jones property but did
not follow the example of its neighbors.

The Getty wells were more

than 7 feet high and prevented Jones from using his irrigation
system.
The Texas Court applied the "reasonable necessity" rule and
held that the types of wells placed upon the property were not
reasonably necessary to the mineral owner's enjoyment of its
estate.

The court stated:
"It is well settled that the oil and gas estate
is the dominant estate in the sense that use of as
much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to
produce and remove the minerals is held to be impliedly
authorized by the lease; but that the rights implied
in favor of the mineral estate are to be exercised
with due regard for the rights of the owner of the
servient estate. . . The due regard concept defines
more fully what is to be considered in the determination
of whether a surface use by the lessee is reasonably
necessary. There may be only one manner of use of the
surface whereby the minerals can be produced. The
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lessee has the right to pursue this use, regardless of
. surface damage. Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co. 351
SW2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1961, writ ref'd). And
there may be necessitous temporary use governed by the
same principle. But under the circumstances indicated
here? i.e., where there is an existing use by the
surface owner which would otherwise be precluded or
impaired, and where under the established practices in
the industry there are alternatives available to the
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the
rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require
the adoption of an alternative by the lessee."
470 SW2d at 621-22.
The Court specified that the due regard idea was merely a means
of determining reasonable necessity.

Under Getty, two elements

are necessary to establish a lack of due regard for the rights
of the surface owner.

It must be shown that (1) the surface

owner has n£ reasonable alternatives to his preexisting use and
(2) that there are reasonable and generally accepted alternatives
available to the mineral owner on the property.
Upon rehearing, the Getty Court noted that some confusion
had been caused by its opinion.

The Court clarified its opinion

by stating:
"We do not hold that a mineral lessee's surface
use may be found unreasonable without regard to
the surface uses otherwise available to the surface
owner. The reasonableness of the surface use by the
lessee is to be determined by a consideration of the
circumstances of both and, as stated, the surface
owner is under the burden of establishing the unreasonableness of the lessee's surface use in this
light." Id at 627^ [emphasis supplied]
It is therefore necessary that alternative uses available to the
surface owner be considered.
In Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 SW2d 808 (1972), the Texas
Court further explained and limited Getty.
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"Our holding in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 SW2d
618 (Tex. 1971), is not applicable under the facts of
this case. It is limited to situations in which there
are reasonable methods that may be employed by the
lessee on the leased premises to accomplish the
purposes of this lease." 4 83 SW2d at 812.
The Utah Mining Association has no objection to the Getty
rule as it has been explained by the Texas Court.

It is urged,

however, that the Getty rule was not properly applied in this
case.

The defendant-respondent most certainly showed that the

placement of the road caused damage to an existing use of his
land and there was conflicting evidence as to whether the plaintiffappellant had a reasonable alternative as to the placement of
the road, but the defendant-respondent did not show that he had
no alternatives to his pre-existing use of the land.

Under the

guise of the Getty rule, the defendant-respondent in this case
has asserted the right to dictate to the mineral owner where he
should place his road.

Mere inconvenience to the surface owner

and conflicting evidence as to alternatives available to the
mineral owner does not meet the requirements of Getty.

In this

case, it has been established that the mineral owner placed the
road in a way which required the shortest distance [R. at 27]
and that the mineral owner placed culverts along the road as
needed*

[T. at 130].

As the Court in Getty pointed out:

"The reasonableness of the method and manner of using
the dominant mineral estate may be measured by what
are usual, customary, and reasonable practices in the
industry under circumstances of time, place, and
servient estate uses." Id. at 627.
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Further, the trial court in Getty instructed the jury that it
should weigh the harm and inconvenience to the surface owner
against the alternatives available to the mineral owner.

The

Court specifically found that this was not the proper test.
"This is not the proper test particularly in
the suggestion that inconvenience to Jones
may be a controlling element. There must be a
determination that under all circumstances the
use of the surface by Getty in the manner under
attack is not reasonably necessary. The burden
of proof is upon Jonesf the surface owner."
470 SW2d at 623. [Emphasis supplied]
It may be concluded that Getty turned more upon the fact that
all the other mineral owners in the area had adopted alternatives
which would accomodate the type of irrigation system involved,
than upon the inconvenience suffered by Jones.
The trial court in this case has focused upon the harm
suffered by the surface owner, and there is no showing in the
record that the usual, customary and reasonable practices in the
industry in the area under all circumstances dictated that the
mineral owner should have placed his road differently, or that
the surface owner had no alternatives to the surface use impaired.
The last point raised by the defendant-respondent was that
under the terms of the lease it was given the right to recover
for crops growing upon the land at the time the mineral owner
required its use.

The Utah Mining Association is in complete

agreement with the principle that limitations may be placed upon
the dominant estate by the agreement of the parties. There is
no question in this case that the owner of the dominant estate
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agreed to pay for "growing crops theretofore planted on said
land,"

The question is how growing crops theretofore planted

could possibly be valued at the fair market value of the land
itself.

The lease does not provide for compensation for crops

that may be planted in the future but for the use of the
surface by the mineral owner, nor does the lease provide that
the mineral owner will purchase the land of the surface owner,
nor pay him the value of his land without purchasing it. The
damages to which defendant-respondent is entitled under the
lease should be determined by valuing the crops planted before
the mineral owner required the land for his use and growing at
the time the mineral owner required its use. The value of the
crops is not the value of the land itself.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court is urged to adopt the rule which
recognizes the mineral estate as the dominant estate limited by
the requirement that in exercising the rights of the dominant
estate the mineral owner must only use that portion of the
surface which is reasonably necessary to enable him to enjoy the
mineral estate.

This rule is the rule accepted by most

states which have dealt with these issues. The rule serves the
interest of both the mineral estate owner and the surface estate
owner, while insuring the most effective utilization of resources
and protection of the environment.
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The trial court has failed to adhere to the generally
accepted rule stated above and has further failed to provide an
<

adequate basis for its decision in the case and to maintain
consistency in its decision.

The issues in this case should be:

(1) Did the owner of the mineral estate use only so much of the
surface as was reasonably necessary for his enjoyment of the
mineral estate?; (2) Was the location of the access road by the
mineral owner unreasonably located without giving due regard to
the rights of the surface owner?; and, (3) What rights were
granted to the surface owner by the oil and gas lease?
By applying the recommended rule to these questions, it is
the position of the Utah Mining Association that a just and
reasonable decision can be reached.

However, since the state of

the trial court's decision and the record indicate a great deal
of confusion, it would be in the best interest of the parties
for the Court to remand this case to the trial court with instructions
regarding the correct rule to be applied.

This course is recommended

because of the lack of evidence in the record as to whether the
mineral owner used due regard in the placement of its access
road.

New evidence could be taken and under the proper rule the

issue could be satisfactorily resolved.

Further, the trial

court would be given an opportunity to correct or justify its
ruling in regard to the award of damages to the surface owner
for the mineral owners use of the surface.
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The matter should be remanded to the trial court with
instructions as to the correct rule to be applied.
Respectfully submitted this Q/

day of March, 1976.
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